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REPLY ESSAY
PEP TALKS FOR THE POOR: A REPLY AND
REMONSTRANCE ON THE EVILS OF
SCAPEGOATING
RICHARD DELGADO*
In a Foreword to the Harvard Law Review's 1990 Supreme Court issue,'
Robin West, a noted liberal, takes a giant step to the right. West correctly
notes that the United States Supreme Court has severely restricted the rights
and liberties of members of many outgroups.2 Because liberal legalists tradi-
tionally rely on courts to protect individual freedoms, those freedoms are
endangered by the Supreme Court's refusal to enforce nonpositive individual
rights.' In response, West urges liberal legalists to rethink their strategy for
obtaining the recognition and protection of individual rights and liberties.4
Unfortunately, her solution abandons those whom she supposedly
champions.
Borrowing ideas from Czechoslovakian reformer Vaclav Havel, West pro-
poses that progressive people in the United States do two things: (i) leave
* Charles Inglis Thomson Professor of Law, University of Colorado. J.D., 1974,
University of California at Berkeley (Boalt Hall). I am grateful to Erich Schwiesow, Jean
Stefancic, Harriet Cummings, Penelope Ingber, and Kelly Robinson for comments,
criticism and other forms of encouragement and assistance during the writing of this
Essay.
1 West, The Supreme Court, 1989 Term-Foreword: Taking Freedom Seriously, 104
HARV. L. REV. 43 (1990).
2 For example, West discusses three recent Supreme Court decisions. In Hodgson v.
Minnesota, 110 S. Ct. 2926 (1990), pregnant minors lost the right to have an abortion to
the extent that a state may require them to seek the permission of both parents or the
state judiciary. West, supra note 1, at 79-85. In Cruzan v. Director, Missouri
Department of Health, 110 S. Ct. 2841 (1990), individuals lost the right to die rather than
be kept alive in a vegetative state, when a state decides that evidence of the desire to die in
such circumstances must be clear and convincing. West, supra note 1, at 98-101. In
Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990), Native Americans lost the right to
use peyote during holy sacrament whenever a facially neutral state statute criminalizes its
use. West, supra note 1, at 53-54.
3 West, supra note 1, at 52-53, 59, 102, 106 (arguing that the cases decided in the 1989
Term show that the Court will no longer be amenable to mandating individual rights).
4 Id. at 60, 78, 79, 101-03, 106 (stating that the Court's emphasis on positivist "rules"
rather than on moral principles indicates that it cannot be relied upon to uphold
individual rights).
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aside their fascination with and dependence on courts, and instead direct
their energies and appeals to "the people" and their legislatures;' and
(ii) couch these appeals not in the linguage of rights, but of individual
moral responsibilities.6 Instead of pleading to increasingly unresponsive
judges, liberals should take the case for recognition of rights and protection
of liberty directly to members of the legislature and to the citizenry.' Fur-
thermore, rather than couching arguments in terms of inherent individual
rights, liberal legalists should frame them as calls for individual moral
responsibility, a notion that lies at the heart of the individual freedom that
supports nonpositive rights.8 At times, West speaks of these twin proposals
as matters of prudence-what we ought to do in conservative times.9 At
other points, however, she suggests that the notion of responsibility is itself a
superior framework for protecting freedom and human dignity, irrespective
of the times.' °
Whether based on prudence or principle, the shift West proposes is unfor-
tunate. In showing that this is so, I hope to avoid the time-honored error of
attacking her proposed paradigm shift through the shopworn liberal para-
digm she so correctly jettisons. Every shift looks wrong to those caught up
in the old regime." Yet, one may still question legal and political reformers:
how well does West's new approach square with the lived experience of
members of our society? Will the new approach impose costs, and if so, on
whom?
In this Reply Essay, I argue that West's proposal ignores history and mis-
diagnoses society's needs, and that its ill effects are likely to fall dispropor-
tionately upon the poor and minorities. If I am right, West's proposal is
itself "irresponsible" and should not be adopted. Part I catalogues a number
of defects in West's proposal: Who will bear the burden of her call for
responsibility? Part II looks for the source of her mistake: How could an
5 Id. at 61, 79, 84, 95-96 (examining both Civic Republicanism's emphasis on
communal political life and the need to shift the guardianship of individual liberty away
from the courts and toward the public).
6 Id. at 47, 65-66, 72, 78-79, 83, 91-92, 95-96, 101, 106.
7 Id. at 61, 7., 79 (asserting that if the citizenry and political leaders act responsibly,
then individual rights will be secured, thereby rendering unnecessary appeals to courts for
the safeguarding of these rights).
8 Id. at 79, 106.
1 Id. at 84, 93 (applying the twin proposals specifically to the fight for reproductive
rights and to criminal procedure).
10 Id. at 47, 84, 93 (basing her proposal on prudence or strategy); id. at 65-66, 95-96,
101, 106 (justifying her proposal as a matter of principle).
11 See T. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS (2d ed. 1970)
(discussing the process by which scientific theories change and are supplanted). For an
acerbic commentary on the process of (and resistance to) legal change, see Schlag,
Normative and Nowhere To Go, 43 STAN. L. REV. 167 (1990) (suggesting that the routine
of liberal humanism and normative legal thought is repetitive and useless outside the
world of legal academia).
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ostensibly progressive scholar have written as she did? Part III discusses
what reformers should be doing in today's climate: If not the strategic
retreat West urges, then what?
I. DEFECTS IN THE RIGHTS-FOR-RESPONSIBILITIES APPROACH: WHO
WOULD PAY?
West's is not the only voice that has been calling for liberals to temper
their emphasis on rights in favor of responsibilities. Recently, Harper's
Magazine published a colloquy on just that subject.12 Additionally, this
spring saw the announcement of a new scholarly quarterly, The Responsive
Community: Rights and Responsibilities, edited by sociologist Amitai
Etzioni, and aimed at re-examining society's balance between individual
rights and social responsibilities.' 3 This Part will suggest a number of rea-
sons why I find this drift-particularly West's version of it-troubling.
A. Reason Number One: Who Would Be Found "Irresponsible"
A society's values are always majoritarian: "irresponsible" behavior is
what those other people do.' 4 The values and practices of you and me
always seem unexceptionable to us (with a few blemishes here and there;
nobody is perfect). Thus, West's call for individual reponsibility is unlikely
to focus scrutiny on corporate raiders,'" sellers of junk bonds,' 6 irresponsible
savings-and-loan executives, 17 or developers who despoil the environment.18
12 Forum, Who Owes What to Whom? Drafting a Constitutional Bill of Duties,
HARPER'S, Feb. 1991, at 43 (discussing whether talk of individual rights has undermined
notions of obligation and community).
'3 See Thomas, Freedom of Speech? Well, Not Always.... Denver Post, Apr. 5, 1991,
at 9B (discussing the case of restaurant workers fired for warning a pregnant customer of
the dangers of consuming alcohol, and advocating their protection under the first
amendment); Magner, Probing the Imbalance Between Individual Rights, Chron. of
Higher Educ., Feb. 13, 1991, at A3 (taking a communitarian view of balancing individual
rights with societal needs).
14 See Delgado, Norms and Normal Science: Toward a Critique of Normativity in
Legal Thought, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 933 (1991) (explaining that powerful groups in
society define society's values, so that the values of minorities are considered inferior).
1' E.g., Anders, Small Investors Learn a Hard Lesson About Buy-outs, Wall St. J., Feb.
20, 1991, at Cl (discussing the effects of leveraged buyouts on the small investor).
16 E.g., Eichenwald, Judge Who Gave Milken 10 Years Wants Him Eligible for Parole
in 3, N.Y. Times, Feb. 20, 1991, at A1, col. 1 (discussing a judge's decision to soften the
punishment of an infamous white-collar criminal).
11 E.g., Weinstein, Professionals Not Blameless in Savings and Loan Scandal, Nat'l
L.J., Feb. 18, 1991, at 12 (arguing that blame should attach to the lawyers and
accountants of the affected banks).
18 E.g., Amoroso & Keenan, Liability for Restoration Is Looming, Nat'l L.J., Feb. 4,
1991, at 19 (noting the lack of judgments for natural resource damages despite federal
and state statutory authority to recover for such injury).
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It would also fail to focus on a corporate CEO who closes or relocates a
factory, thereby plunging an entire city into poverty and chaos.19
A call for responsibility could be directed at those in power-politicians,
corporate executives, and wealthy taxpayers-as well as at political dissi-
dents, welfare mothers, and others whom society views as troublesome or
deviant. Yet West's Foreword nowhere suggests that she has this redirection
in mind, an omission I find troubling. West indicates that even in the rights-
based paradigm, the rights of the powerful and privileged classes expand at
the same time that the rights of outgroups contract.2' A responsibilities-
based paradigm would only exaggerate this tendency because the behavior of
the outgroups, rather than that of those in power, would be called into ques-
tion. Moreover, calling majoritarian behavior into question would fly in the
face of one of West's rationales for the new focus, namely the need for quiet-
ism and a low profile for members of outgroups in a conservative era. After
all, if one is trying to keep a low profile, then one would scarcely want to
point a finger at a powerful person. Finally, even if West had this redirec-
tion in mind, but did not state it, the redirection contradicts truths of human
nature-namely, that onerous duties such as taxation2 and military service22
are often shifted to those least able to resist. While budget cutbacks are
directed toward services for the poor, entitlements and benefits for the mid-
dle class remain untouched.23
As West's own examples show, we reserve the label "irresponsible" for
those who are Other. For instance, she decries recent efforts to expand
rights of sexual autonomy, particularly the right to have an abortion.24 She
argues that instead we should demand that citizens have sex responsibly,
have abortions only for good reasons, and otherwise open themselves to
11 The film Roger and Me (Warner Bros. 1989) graphically depicts the destitution
caused by the closing of an automobile plant in Flint, Michigan.
20 West, supra note 1, at 51 (describing how Christian children won the right to
establish Bible study groups in public schools, and how political activists won the right to
burn the flag as an expression of discontent).
21 E.g., THE REAGAN RECORD: AN ASSESSMENT OF AMERICA'S CHANGING
DOMESTIC PRIORITIES (J. Palmer & I. Sawhill 2d ed. 1984) (stating that deregulation,
tax changes and other measures led to a massive transfer of wealth from the working
class to the wealthy); see also THE REAGAN EXPERIMENT: AN EXAMINATION OF
ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL POLICIES UNDER THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION (J. Palmer &
I. Sawhill eds. 1982) (asserting that the income tax structure in the United States divides
the tax burden among those with unequal ability to pay and results in tax cuts favorable
to the rich).
22 E.g., Sirica, More Minorities Serving in Gulf- Growth in Black, Female Ranks,
Newsday, Dec. 20, 1990, at 15 (Nassau and Suffolk ed.) (stating that Blacks constitute
23% of all-volunteer enlisted force, yet constitute only 13% of the general population).
23 E.g., Peterson, The Morning After, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Oct. 1987, at 43, 62
("[Njearly all the painful and high-visibility cuts have been made in the 15 percent of the
benefit programs that are means-tested.").
24 West, supra note 1, at 67-68, 79-85.
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scrutiny of their intimate conduct.2" On whom will this new code of sexual
responsibility fall? Not, I predict, on upper-class white males in positions of
power who cut a wide swath through female society of the nation's capital.
Rather, it will fall on single mothers of color who have sex and babies26 out
of personal choice, culture, or simply as a way of finding pleasure and mean-
ing in otherwise unfulfilling lives.'
Consider also her discussion of the right to die." As West frames it in the
perspective of responsibility, the issue comes perilously close to a "right to
live." Once society acts upon West's dismissal of traditional liberal anti-
paternalism, it collectively assumes responsibility not only for restraining
runaway life-support technology, but also for allocating scarce societal
resources involving less extreme examples of medical technology. Under
this approach, who will be urged to. decline medical treatment, to die
"responsibly"? Surely not those who can afford to prolong life by buying
expensive treatments, 29 but rather the nonproductive, the poor, the infirm,
and the aged."0
Consider, finally, her discussion of "responsible" speech.3' According to
25 Id. at 79, 81-85. For example, pregnant teenagers should, if possible, talk things
over with a "loving parent," a suggestion unlikely to play well in the ghetto.
26 To be sure, rights (e.g., to have sex) and entitlements (e.g., to well-baby care) stand
on different footings. That both are being curtailed, however, demonstrates society's
unwillingness to tolerate what it considers "irresponsible sex" or reproduction.
27 R. BROOKS, RETHINKING THE AMERICAN RACE PROBLEM 111-14 (1990)
(discussing the reasons for the high incidence of pregnancies among unwed teenage black
women); The Pain of Being Black, TIME, May 22, 1989, at 120 (interview with Toni
Morrison) (discussing societal response to black teenage pregnancy). The call for
responsible sex also presumes that women in our society have total (or at least great)
control over their reproductive abilities. This is not true, particularly for non-white
women and those with little education. It is easy for college-educated, upper-class
women (like West) to argue that abortion should not be readily available, or that access
to it should be limited, or that resort to it should be "responsible," or that irresponsible
women should pay the price of their misbehavior. That argument assumes, however, that
everyone has the same level of education and access to contraceptive services-an
assumption that flies in the face of what we (should) know. Restricting the right to an
abortion, or even discouraging its exercise, increases the power of men vis-a-vis women,
and falls disproportionately heavily on non-white, poor women.
28 West, supra note 1, at 98-101.
29 A recent report mentioned a physician who had obtained a fifth kidney replacement
for himself. Interview with Michael Shapiro, Professor of Law, Southern California Law
Center (Feb. 26, 1991).
30 West, supra note 1, at 101 ("Nancy Cruzan has no values, preferences, or wishes,
idiosyncratic or otherwise, to be respected."); id. at 99 ("The morally intolerable strain
on ... societal resources is occasioned not by the will to die, but by the maintenance of
vegetative life against the desires and interests of all parties.") (emphasis in original); see
also id. at 98 (noting that technology alters concepts of life and death-but only for those
who cannot afford life-prolonging medical treatments).
31 Id. at 93-98 (arguing that the first amendment should protect meaningful,
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West, even though a citizen has a right to speak, the message of that speech
is still subject to societal scrutiny because some messages are so antisocial
that they should not be spoken. 2 Will this approach single out a Madison
Avenue advertising firm that is trying to sell large, gas-guzzling cars, or will
it scrutinize the flag-burner or ghetto resident who shakes a fist and shouts
"Pigs, out!" at a passing patrol car? The irresponsible label will be reserved
for speech that makes us uncomfortable, or that violates majoritarian values
and standards. This is not a serious a problem for Vaclav Havel's Czecho-
slovakia, whose relatively homogenous population is united by a common
history."3 In ours, I will argue, it is.
B. Reason Number Two: Withdrawal of Support
The call for responsibility is also likely to be coupled with a withdrawal of
support from those found irresponsible. For Vaclav Havel, responsibility
was an intensely personal notion.' In our society, however, group harms
and redress play large roles. Unlike Czechoslovakia, our nation has inflicted
monstrous harms on Blacks, Native Americans, Asians, and Chicanos."
West's call for responsibility, as I have pointed out, will be directed dispro-
portionately at just these groups. Because these groups will have difficulty
responsible, and truthful communication as opposed to insulated, individualistic acts of
expression).
32 West, supra note 1, at 95 (arguing that the "moral authority of the Constitution is
thrown into doubt" by protecting scathing speech). A speaker's motives come into play
in certain situations under current law. See, e.g., New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S.
254 (1964) (holding that a public official may not recover damages for libel absent proof
of malice by defendant); New York v. Sullivan, 889 F.2d 401 (2d Cir. 1989), aff'd sub
nom. Rust v. Sullivan, 111 S. Ct. 1759 (1991) (upholding a ban on abortion counseling in
federally funded clinics). West's suggestion, however, potentially opens up a broader
range of speech to motive-based examination.
33 See infra text accompanying notes 98-99. This homogeneity is not necessarily to
Czechoslovakia's credit. Czechoslovakia transformed its population, of which more than
one-third was ethnic groups prior to World War II, to a homogeneous one after the war.
It did so by deporting Germans, by participating in an exchange of populations with
Hungary, by ceding Ruthania-which had a Ukranian population-to the USSR, and by
failing to classify Gypsies as an ethnic group. 16 NEW ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA 910
(1991).
34 West, supra note 1, at 65-66 (arguing that the struggle for a genuinely liberal society
takes place not in the abstract projects for an ideal political or economic order, but
instead focuses on the concrete needs of the individual); id. at 95-96 (stating that every
citizen must decide whether to become a morally responsible individual).
35 See D. BELL, JR., RACE, RACISM AND AMERICAN LAW (2d ed. 1980); R.
WILLIAMS, THE AMERICAN INDIAN IN WESTERN LEGAL THOUGHT (1990); Delgado,
Derrick Bell and the Ideology of Law Reform: Will We Ever Be Saved?, 97 YALE L.J.
923, 935-42 (1988).
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responding to this call for responsibility, we will enable ourselves to avoid
neatly our own role in their subjugation.'
The admonition to "be responsible" shifts the onus of change to those at
whom the call is aimed. If we continue to reduce services such as birth
control, abortion, 37 prenatal and well-baby care, however, we will reduce
rather than increase the capacity of poor women of color to take control of
their own lives.31 Moreover, if we can conveniently be rid of sixty-year-old
black men, dying of the effects of lifelong hypertension,39 then we can justify
withholding expensive treatment from them while they are alive and func-
tional. The call for responsibility will likely atomize and absolve us of any
sense of collective obligation and fault by focusing on individuals, even
though many of our social pathologies have a group dimension.4"
C. Reason Number Three: Paternalism and the Revival of Settlement
House Mentality
West's proposal has more than a whiff of the condescension and genteel
racism of the Settlement House Movement.4 ' It hearkens back to the early
years of this century, when patrician white women of the Movement volun-
teered to work with the big-city poor, particularly with recent immigrants of
36 See supra text accompanying notes 14-33.
37 Rust v. Sullivan, 111 S. Ct. 1759 (1991) (upholding ban on abortion counseling in
federally funded clinics); R. BROOKS, supra note 27, at 111-12 (stating that a lack of
sexual education and access to contraceptives is a factor in some teen pregnancies among
African Americans, and that pregnant teenagers are far less likely than other expectant
mothers to receive prenatal care).
31 See R. BROOKS, supra note 27 (proposing self-help and governmental aid to poor
people of color to enable them to attain greater social and economic stability).
31 Black men have a higher incidence of serious hypertension than others, which some
scientists attribute to the frustrations and assaults of living in a racist world. Goleman,
Anger over Racism Is Seen as a Cause of Blacks' High Blood Pressure, N.Y. Times, Apr.
24, 1990, at C3, col. 1.
40 Compare Delgado, supra note 14, at 947-52 (discussing the high degree of
dependence that normative arguments and conclusions have on context) with West, supra
note 1, at 44, 68 (decrying promiscuity and consumerism among society's
"irresponsible") and id. at 71-72 (arguing that the current rights-based regime inhibits
empathy and fellow-feeling). But see Williams, Alchemical Notes, Reconstructing Ideals
from Deconstructed Rights, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 401 (1987) (arguing the
contrary, that rights embolden and enhance the dignity of persons of color).
41 See H. KRAUSS, THE SETrLEMENT HOUSE MOVEMENT IN NEW YORK CITY,
1886-1914 (1981) (studying the New York City Settlement House Movement and its
impact on the community); HANDBOOK OF SETTLEMENTS (R. Woods & A. Kennedy
eds. 1970) (detailing the education that the settlement houses gave to their members); see
also H. KARGER, THE SENTINELS OF ORDER: A STUDY OF SOCIAL CONTROL & THE
MINNEAPOLIS SETTLEMENT HOUSE MOVEMENT, 1915-1950 (1987) (citing a case study
of social control exerted by a branch of voluntary private social service).
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color.42 These women taught the immigrants American standards of cleanli-
ness and child care; how Americans ate, dressed, and behaved in public.
They also taught them the language that Americans used: English.4
West's call for responsibility resembles the Settlement House Movement
because it imposes majoritarian values on minority subcultures in a particu-
larly patronizing and demeaning way." It would privilege straight, middle-
class, highly educated persons; it would call for the poor to give up casual
sex and sharp-edged speech;4" it would enjoin protesters to think twice
before burning an American flag." West may think of her proposal as a
strategic retreat for liberals, but I think her prescription for our times
entirely misreads our predicament, as well as the way out of it.
47
One might argue that certain features of particular subcultures do indeed
invite reform. For example, black men often do not remain with their fami-
lies; Chicano youth often join gangs, part of whose program is antisocial;
and some Latino men are said to demonstrate their manhood and social sta-
tus by indiscriminate fathering of children. The problem with West's sug-
gestion, however, is that increased responsibility will likely focus only on
those groups and their transgressions. It will not examine the equally or
perhaps more serious flaws of defense contractors, corporate raiders, pol-
luters, and wealthy taxpayers who avoid a fair share of their taxes.
Given this likely inequity, why should the poor and members of outgroups
care about being responsible? Certainly, they would not strive to be respon-
sible to a system that denies them equity and dignity, and that consistently
labels them outcasts. From whence would come their motivation? Respon-
sibility would simply give powerful elites further license to condemn those
they disfavor. Equally disconcerting is the possibility that a few members of
the disadvantaged group might internalize the new message and begin to
blame themselves for current conditions, thereby relaxing pressure for neces-
sary social reform.
D. Reason Number Four: Scapegoating
As I have argued, West's call for responsibility is likely to focus on soci-
ety's mavericks and minorities. It is likely to result in the withdrawal of
material support, overlook the more pernicious behavior of well-heeled cor-
41 See J. ADDAMS, TWENTY YEARS AT HULL-HOUSE (Macmillan 1910) (discussing
the targets of the Settlement House Movement); HANDBOOK OF SETTLEMENTS, supra
note 41 (cataloguing the settlement houses that existed in the early twentieth century).
43 The present-day "English only" movement seems to draw on many of the same
attitudes of the earlier Settlement House Movement.
44 See, e.g., West, supra note 1, at 93 (urging indoctrination and re-education of
criminals under the banner of reviving the rehabilitative ideal).
45 See supra text accompanying notes 24-27, 31-32.
46 West, supra note I, at 93-96 (discussing United States v. Eichman, 110 S. Ct. 2404
(1990)).
17 Concerning the way out, see discussion infra part III.
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porate types, and atomize and diffuse group blame and responsibility. In an
ironic reversal of Harry Kalven's thesis,' Blacks and others will be blamed
for the current retrenchment of civil liberties and for liberals' angst at seeing
the obliteration of many of the Warren Court's gains. Kalven wrote that
many beneficial reforms were born of the cauldron of. racial justice; societal
evils that afflicted Blacks stood out even more glaringly in the light of racial
bigotry and animus.49 Once in place, reforms such as procedural due pro-
cess for school children' and protection for unpopular picketers"' and
lunch-counter demonstrators, 52 benefited everyone, not just Blacks.
West's call illustrates a melancholy corollary to Kalven's thesis: when
things get tough, liberals will abandon support for populations of color to
preserve their own comfort and security. The practices and "irresponsibili-
ties" of outgroups will be portrayed as the source of our troubles. We will
beseech them-gently or not so gently-to change so as not to elicit further
wrath from the gods of the Supreme Court. "Behave!" we will say, "(Like
us)."
5 3
II. THE SOURCE OF THE TROUBLE: EXPLAINING ROBIN WEST'S LURCH
TO THE RIGHT
Despite the problems that I have pointed out, West undoubtedly thinks
that her proposal is harmless, if not beneficial, to the poor and outgroups.
How can she think this? There are a number of possibilities.
As a feminist, West may have extended care-and-connection themes, char-
acteristic of a certain strand of feminism,' 4 to areas where they do not work
well. These themes call for an increase in the communal bond-"let's love
each other more." In this respect, West imagines that if individuals take
48 H. KALVEN, JR., THE NEGRO AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT (1965) (arguing that
the civil rights movement had a profound impact on first amendment theory).
49 Id. (stressing the general theme that the civil rights and civil liberties movements
were intertwined).
10 E.g., Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975) (holding that suspending children from
school without a hearing is a violation of procedural due process).
51 Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229 (1963) (holding that a conviction for
disturbing the peace while picketing violated first amendment rights).
12 Garner v. Louisiana, 368 U.S. 157 (1961) (holding that evidence of disturbing the
peace while sitting at a lunch counter was so vague, indefinite, and uncertain, that
prosecution violated due process). See generally H. KALVEN, JR., supra note 48, at 140-
45 (discussing convictions for disturbing the peace and their effects on civil liberties).
51 For the view that the majority race has offered up Blacks as burnt offerings in our
quest for equality and freedom, see D. BELL, JR., supra note 35, at 1-71 (taking an
historical look at racial remedies); Bell, Bakke, Minority Admissions and the Price of
Racial Remedies, 67 CALIF. L. REV. 3 (1979) (arguing that racial remedies are modest
advances for blacks, not exceeding the benefits gained by whites).
14 See C. GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE (1982) (studies of connections between
oneself and others based on a rights and responsibility theory); West, supra note 1, at 84-
85 (echoing this view).
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responsibility for their actions and for the actions of those around them,
community acceptance and protection of rights will be strengthened.
A little love never hurt, but our problems run much deeper than that.
People of color and the poor do not suffer from a lack of love, but from an
unremitting institutional subordination that has ranged broadly across sev-
eral centuries into areas of education, jobs, and housing.' West's article is
not the work of an "organic intellectual," in Gramsci's sense,' because it is
not rooted in the experience of oppressed peoples. It lacks both grounding
in history and contemporary experience with class and color-based oppres-
sion. How else can we explain her proposal that society scrutinize the deci-
sion of a young, unwed, black, pregnant woman to determine if her wish for
an abortion is "considered" or "responsible"?
A second possibility is that West, like many legal scholars, has fallen into
the normative habit and now cannot conceive of a non-normative alternative
such as direct action." The Supreme Court today tends to decide on
straight precedential grounds, and writes many opinions that have remarka-
bly little normative quality. Opinions that hint at normative reasoning are
decided on the basis of values such as efficiency and original intent, values
that West and other liberals do not share.". Worse, the Court seems utterly
indifferent to the types of appeals that succeeded with the Warren Court-to
humanity, compassion, mercy, equality, generosity, and so on.
59
West, and other liberals distressed by the Court's slant, could have
responded by choosing among many non-normative alternatives, a few of
which are discussed in the final section of this Essay. Once in the normative
habit, however, one searches for a normative solution.' Faced with a
Supreme Court that will not listen to impassioned normative pleas, liberals
have chosen to try their normative message on the poor: "They'll listen-
they'd better! And, while we're at it, we'll try each other. We'll listen too
because we know we are already responsible; for us the start-up costs of the
new responsibility regime are negligible, requiring few changes in our own
behavior."
A third possible explanation for West's mistake is optimism. White liber-
5 See sources cited supra notes 21, 23, 27.
5 Attributed to Antonio Gramsci, the term refers to one who places his or her
intellect at the service of the people, proposes theories and action programs rooted in
their experience, and regards the people as the source of his or her inspiration and
authority.
51 On the normative habit (and how to break it), see Delgado, supra note 14, at 959.
58 West, supra note 1, at 43 (criticizing Court decisions on the grounds that individual
freedom lost ground to state control).
59 Schlag, supra note 11, at 168 (stating that postmodern ideas have conquered
normative ones).
60 Delgado, supra note 14, at 959-60 (suggesting an exchange of abstraction of ethical
discourse for deductive reasoning); Schlag, supra note 11, at 176, 189-90 (discussing the
fall of normativity).
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als, like West, are notably more sanguine than people of color over prospects
for racial reform.6' Whites believe things will get better: if we do nothing
(because the gap between Blacks and Whites is already closing, if not
closed); 2 if we just talk together; if we show compassion and concern.
Blacks and others know better.6" The reasons for this difference in out-
look-pessimistic Blacks, optimistic Whites-are complex, involving self-
blame on the one hand, and racial guilt on the other.64
West's overly quick embrace of a neo-communitarian solution reveals
characteristic majoritarian optimism. Talking together about responsibility
and shared goals may yield consensus, but that consensus may just as easily
prove to be coercive, based on a misleading agreement.' The mixed-race
group talks, probably endlessly, about responsibility, community, and the
means of preserving liberty in a conservative era. But shared understand-
ings, themselves shaped by racism and class domination, will affect what is
discussed, whose behavior is examined, and how "responsibility" is
framed. At some point during the conversation, the less empowered con-
versants will fall silent. "Now we are getting somewhere," the more empow-
ered conversants will declare (a reaction I .predict will greet West's article
itself from her fellow liberal readers, but from few of color).67
A final explanation for West's having landed on such treacherous ground
61 On this remarkable difference, see Delgado, supra note 35, at 929-34 (setting forth a
dialogue between a doctor and patient regarding the pessimistic view that Blacks have
about racial reforms and why). But see West, supra note 1, at 75 (stating Havel's
optimistic argument that genuine democracy can be sustained when leaders are held
personally responsible).
62 Delgado, supra note 35, at 932-34 (discussing the white view of black social
progress).
63 Id. at 932-34 (discussing political action as a vehicle for social change).
64 Id. at 928-34, 937, 945-47 (discussing the origins of the different outlooks of black
and white individuals).
6 See Delgado, Critical Legal Studies and the Realities of Race, 23 HARV. C.R.-C.L.
L. REV. 407, 409-13 (1988) (describing the differing racial views of community and
structure); Delgado, ADR and the Dispossessed (Book Review), 13 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY
145, 152-54 (1988) (describing the likelihood of prejudicial results when minorities enter
into alternative dispute resolution); see also Delgado, Brewer's Plea: Critical Thoughts on
Common Cause, 44 VAND. L. REV. 1 (1991) (describing the lack of common basis for
discussion between critical race scholars and mainstream liberals).
61 See Note, Race and Racism in the University, 76 VA. L. REV. 295 (1990) (authored
by Darryl Brown) (describing the community's role in deciding which actions are
considered "racist").
67 West may be speaking of very small cells and groups, where dialogue would not be
subject to these pitfalls. White society, however, has never been comfortable with Blacks
or other ethnic groups forming small same-race groups. Black theme houses, dorms, and
cafeterias always generate fear and resentment among white students. See Delgado et al.,
Can Science Be Inopportune? Constitutional Validity of Governmental Restrictions on
Race-I.Q. Research, 31 UCLA L. REv. 128, 195 n.404 (1983) (describing a racial
incident at a black students' dormitory at Cornell University); Lawrence, If He Hollers
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is essentialism. 68 Her new concept of responsibility is notably more unitary,
judgmental, and essentialist even than rights. We must be responsible,
Havel says, echoed by West, to "the world" 69-- but to whose world? Our
society's concept of the world is fragmented.7" To which world are we to be
responsible? And what do we do when responsibility to one world (say, our
religion) conflicts with responsibility to another (say, our ethnic group)?
There are many worlds, not one universalizing, totalizing, essentialized
world. Groups have different experiences and different histories, and have
been advantaged or disadvantaged in radically different ways. To urge
responsible behavior as though that were an easily understood notion, capa-
ble of universal application, is simply to misconceive the complexity of our
(particularly the minority) experience.
Havel urged that individuals "live in truth."7 An inspiring idea, but
whose truth does he mean?7" Who decides whether the ghetto male who
shakes a fist at the passing police car has spoken and lived "in truth" or is
simply a budding criminal?7" West might reply that living in truth means
only taking each other seriously, struggling together to reach a consensual
truth richer than that with which we began.74 This view, however, is still
subject to the pitfalls of consensus-reaching among conversants of radically
different degrees of power and status. It is also likely to run up against
unbridgeable gaps, particularly in times like ours, when society is increas-
Let Him Go: Regulating Racist Speech on Campus, 1990 DUKE L.J. 431, 433 (1990)
(describing a racial incident at a black students' dormitory at Stanford University).
68 See Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L. REV. 581,
602-05 (1990) (describing West's view of essentialism).
69 West, supra note 1, at 66, 72 (quoting Havel).
70 Winter, Contingency and Community in Practice, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 963 (1991)
(stating that "community" is a cognitive phenomenon).
71 West, supra note 1, at 67-69 (quoting Havel).
72 On the multiplicity of truth in our postmodern world, see generally P. BERGER & T.
LUCKMAN, THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF REALITY (1967); N. GOODMAN, WAYS OF
WORLDMAKING (1978); L. HUTCHEON, A POETICS OF POSTMODERNISM: ESSAYS ON
THE POETICS AND RHETORIC AND LAW (1985); Lyotard, Answering the Question: What
Is Postmodernism?, in THE POSTMODERN CONDITION: A REPORT ON KNOWLEDGE 71
(G. Bennington & B. Massurni trans. 1984).
71 See Kairys, Freedom of Speech, in THE POLITICS OF LAW 237, 259-66 (D. Kairys
2d ed. 1990) (describing the conflict between the modem ideology and the reality of free
speech).
74 See West, supra note 1, at 70-71 (quoting Havel: "A world where 'truth' flourishes
not in a dialectic climate of genuine knowledge, but in a climate of power motives, is a
world of mental sterility, petrified dogmas, rigid and unchangeable creeds leading
inevitably to creedless despotism."); id. at 95-96 ("What is honored and hence protected
[when a postdemocratic society protects dissent] is not the isolated, individualistic act of
expression, but the social, critical, and above all cultural act of morally responsible
communication." (emphasis in original)); id. at 104 (stating that familiarity with Native
American Church customs will breed greater desire to maintain them); id. at 106 (urging
liberals to educate themselves culturally and politically).
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ingly polarized. One person, on seeing a starving beggar, may react with
loathing-"why doesn't that man get a job?" Another may respond with
sympathy, having been poor herself.7" If persons perceive the world differ-
ently and attach different meanings to the same experiences, then living in
truth is simply a prescription for solipsism. 7' This may be acceptable in a
nation like Havel's Czechoslovakia, struggling to free itself from stifling con-
formity and the statist excesses of previous regimes, but our society needs
something different.
III. IF NOT RESPONSIBILITY, THEN WHAT? ON CHOOSING THE
WRONG CZECH
West's recent embrace of responsibility over rights is predictable, appeal-
ing-and wrong. As I have shown, it is ahistorical-not grounded in the
experience of the oppressed-and paternalistic, and will likely be coupled
with withdrawal of desperately needed material support. It looks to a
repressive dialogue to set its terms, judges responsibility by middle-class
norms, condemns the behaviors and practices of outgroups only, and revives
the genteel racism and paternalism of the Settlement House Movement. The
only good thing that can be said about West's proposal is that it may, for a
little while, appease the conservatives on the Supreme Court.
Is there a better course of action? There is, but we must turn to different
sources to find it. Our own political tradition contains many candidates
whom West might have chosen as models,7 7 but if she desired to look abroad
for fresh sources, she might have looked to someone other than Vaclav
Havel, to a different Czech, one who was writing with times more like ours
in mind.
Novelist Milan Kundera, author of The Unbearable Lightness of Being7"
and other works,79 wrote about the era just before Havel came to power.80
11 See Delgado, supra note 14, at 954, 956 (describing how normativity allows the
majority to ignore suffering).
76 Id. at 936 (stating that normative legal thought and discourse has a circular
quality); see Schlag, supra note 11, at 180-81 (describing the tendency toward solipsism).
But see West, supra note 1, at 104 (arguing that attention to other cultures and their
problems will heighten empathy).
71 E.g., M.L. KING, JR., Letter from a Birmingham City Jail, in A TESTAMENT OF
HOPE (J.M. Washington ed. 1986); T. PAINE, Common Sense, in COMMON SENSE, AND
OTHER POLITICAL WRITINGS (N. Adkins ed. 1953); H. THOREAU, On Civil
Disobedience, in WALDEN, AND CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE (0. Thomas ed. 1966).
78 M. KUNDERA, THE UNBEARABLE LIGHTNESS OF BEING (M. Heim trans. 1984).
79 E.g., M. KUNDERA, THE BOOK OF LAUGHTER AND FORGETTING (M. Heim trans.
1986). For a more recent work, see M. KUNDERA, IMMORTALITY (1991), a rather less
political work, not even set in Czechoslovakia.
80 Milan Kundera was born in Brno in 1929, the son of a well-known concert pianist.
He taught at the National Film School until 1969, when he lost his position in the unrest
following the Russian invasion of Czechoslovakia. Because the authorities were making
his life increasingly difficult, he left Czechoslovakia in 1975 for a position at the
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This was a period when Czechs were struggling to overthrow their corrupt
and totalitarian leadership and ultimately to install the more enlightened,
post-Western regime of Havel. The Czech people engaged in secret and pub-
lic insurrection, mass demonstrations, strikes, and street theatre.8 ' Within
this atmosphere of struggle against a totalitarian government, Kundera
emphasized intense individualism.' In a world where "responsibility" was
colored by the same actors demanding responsible action, his characters
found paramount their responsibility to themselves and to the things they
held dear. 3
In The Unbearable Lightness of Being, the protagonist, Tomas, is torn
between two women who represent opposite poles of his lifes -Sabina, the
artist, the mistress, the one who plays the same games by the same rules
("the unwritten contract of erotic friendship"85 ), and Tereza, his wife, who
offers him undying and faithful, albeit jealous, love (in explicit violation of
the rules of erotic friendship). Sabina is self-sufficient, and holds herself
University of Rennes in France. McEwan, An Interview with Milan Kundera, 11
GRANTA 21 (1984).
Kundera's first novel, The Joke, was published in Czechoslovakia in 1967 and created a
major commotion during the "Prague Spring." The Czech communist party banned this,
and other works by Kundera, from bookshops and libraries during the "normalization"
period that followed the invasion. While in exile, he wrote The Book of Laughter and
Forgetting and The Unbearable Lightness of Being, the works for which he is perhaps best
known in the West. Id. at 21-22. These books, like The Joke, are concerned with the
dangers of political dogmatizing, the abuses of power, the political control of the past,
and the false lure of utopias. Kundera's wit hits its favorite target in heavy-handed
government of any type. He finds political excesses absurd, antihuman, and darkly
comical. His novels remorselessly debunk bureaucracy, "kitsch," and all forms of
groupthink. Id. at 23-32.
81 M. KUNDERA, THE BOOK OF LAUGHTER AND FORGETTING, supra note 79, at 3,
13-14; M. KUNDERA, supra note 78, at 25-27, 67.
82 See Molesworth, Kundera and The Book- The Unsaid and the Unsayable, 73
SALMAGUNDI 65 (1987) (arguing that Kundera's idea of the unity of European identity is
based on his belief in the sanctity of the individual and the paradoxical awareness that
when individuals form groups they destroy individuality, and with it the source of all
sanctity); see also M. KUNDERA, THE BOOK OF LAUGHTER AND FORGETTING, supra
note 79, at 236-37.
83 See M. KUNDERA, supra note 78, at 186 (describing a scene in which a man from
Communist Party Ministry of the Interior urges Tomas, the protagonist, to sign a
retraction of an article critical of the regime because it is an irresponsible article, but
Tomas refuses and is forced to give up his job as a brain surgeon and become a window
washer); cf id. at 217-20 (explaining that Tomas's responsibility to himself and to his
wife overrides his duty to the people as articulated by his friends in the resistance
movement).
84 Id. at 27-29 (depicting Tomas's inability to think of an excuse to tell Tereza in order
to visit Sabina).
85 Id. at 13 (explaining that the unwritten contract of erotic friendship stipulated that
Tomas must exclude love from his life).
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apart from her lovers as she holds herself apart from her country, watching
its demise from afar, commenting on the "kitsch" of the intellectuals who
try to redeem it. Tereza, who cannot exist apart from her relationship with
Tomas.and Czechoslovakia, returns to her country from her exile in Switzer-
land, and, because she feels that her return is weak, resigns to take her place
with the weak (i.e., with the Czechs).
In the same way that he is torn between the two women, Tomas is torn
between different forms of political action. After being asked by his resist-
ance friends to sign a petition for the release of political prisoners, Tomas
reframes the question to sign or not to sign: "Another way of formulating
the question is, is it better to shout and thereby hasten the end, or to keep
silent and gain thereby a slower death?"' 6 Kundera maintains that we can
never know. In the words of the German saying, Einmal ist Keinmal (once
is never at all)-we can never go back and make the opposite decision in
order to compare the two. We cannot choose Sabina and then Tereza to see
which life we like better; we can never sign and then not sign. In the end,
Tomas elects not to sign, out of a sense of individual rather than political
responsibility.
Within the increasingly totalitarian atmosphere of a conservative Supreme
Court, responsibility for individual action, arguably, must remain our focus
as well. Responsibility in Kundera's interpretation of Havel is the unflinch-
ing recognition that "there is no unity between a man's character and his
destiny, that the one is always victim of the other."87 Destiny may some-
times demand the kind of compromise that West's vision of responsibility
entails, but we must not lose ourselves in the mass. Above all, we must
remember the existential predicament that Kundera's characters face, for it
is ours as well. We cannot sacrifice rights to the notion of collective respon-
sibility and then later undo that sacrifice.
Kundera's emphasis on individual integrity is again reflected by a charac-
ter named Mirek from The Book of Laughter and Forgetting."' Mirek keeps
an account of everything. He maintains a careful diary, keeps correspon-
dence, and takes notes at meetings where there is a discussion of the current
situation and debate of future plans."9 His friends accuse him of being care-
less, but Mirek insists on his right to write and to have such things, arguing
that it is protected by the constitution.O Later, Mirek begins to feel guilty
for endangering himself and his friends, and decides to dispose of the incrim-
86 Id. at 222.
87 Kundera, A Life Like a Work of Art: Homage to Vaclav Havel, NEW REPUBLIC,
Jan. 29, 1990, at 16, 17.
88 Supra note 79.
89 Id. at 3-4.
90 Id. at 4.
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inating papers." Just before Mirek is able to follow through with his plan,
however, he is caught and sentenced to prison.
92
Ironically, as soon as Mirek has decided to submit to the state and to
allow it to dictate what he can and cannot say (symbolized by his decision to
stop keeping the papers), the state completely deprives him of all of his
rights (i.e., jails him). For Mirek, imprisonment is the best ending his life
could have, because at least he suffers that fate for something in which he
believes-the right to individual expression. While we are facing a hostile,
conservative Supreme Court, we ought to see the wisdom in continuing to
fight for what we believe. We should not give in to the majoritarian pres-
sures because, as with Mirek, giving in will only hasten the death of progres-
sive movements.
Kundera also emphasizes the importance of history. In The Book of
Laughter and Forgetting, Kundera proclaims, "[T]he struggle of man against
power is the struggle of memory against forgetting. '93 The book's heroine,
Tamina, constantly struggles against forgetting her past. When she gives up
her struggle in exchange for a place where she can "forget her forgetting"
and feel no remorse for it,94 she is taken to an island inhabited only by chil-
dren who do not "allow the future to collapse under the burden of mem-
ory."' It is the perfect place for Tamina to end her struggle. When Tamina
ceases to look back, however, she cannot stand her life any longer and ends
up drowning as the children, the symbol of having no past, watch her.96
Robin West, like Tamina, should not try to escape the past. If West had
heeded the history of Native Americans, the poor, and Blacks, she might
well have hesitated to call for responsibility. By ignoring our nation's expe-
rience with oppression and calling for a shift from rights toward responsibili-
ties, West endangers the cause of social justice. One must look back if one is
to move forward; civil rights activists will never win the struggle against
oppressive power if they ignore the sad narratives of the past.97
Other reasons counsel caution in embracing Havel, at least over other
authors and approaches to protecting human dignity. Our society has not
reached the stability that the Czechoslovakian nation has attained under
Havel, and, possibly, it may never. The Czech nation was united.98 Unlike
91 Id.
92 Id. at 23-24.
93 Id. at 3.
94 Id. at 163-64.
95 Id. at 187.
96 Id. at 191, 234-35 (Afterword, interview with Phillip Roth).
97 E.g., Delgado, supra note 35, at 923-24 (citing Derrick Bell's fictional dialogue); id.
at 929-47 (explaining that the only way for minorities to move forward, when faced with
history of failed civil rights reform, is to rewrite the Constitution).
98 Kundera, The Tragedy of Central Europe, N.Y. Rev. Books, Apr. 26, 1984, at 33
(stating that almost the entire population of Czechoslovakia supported the revolution in
the Prague Spring of 1968).
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us, most sectors in Czechoslovakia disapproved of the totalitarian govern-
ment and wanted reform. Most Czechs had a common memory-they
remembered what they had been as a people before they were oppressed. 9
They were bonded through history, blood, religion, ethnicity, and a common
oppression. Once the oppressive government was ready to fall, heeding
Havel's call-"Care for each other!"-was easy, made sense.
The United States is different. Our poor and minorities do not belong
yet."° Too many fences keep them out; their only fragile protection is the
framework of judicially enforced rights that we have elaborately constructed
over the last few decades.'' The only guarantee that we have is of no more
slavery. Our rights only protect us against the most vicious forms of debase-
ment. °2 In the face of this, Professor West calls for consensus, for dialogue,
and for responsibility. She misreads her times. The movement, in Eastern
Europe and elsewhere, is all the other way-away from consensus, toward
assertion of difference, of individual identity. She also misreads her own
culture. We lack today the glue, the impetus, the background for a trust-
based politics. Outsiders have more urgent concerns such as responsibilities
for survival, and responsibilities to self, to neighborhood, and to clan.
West's call for a universalizing, totalizing responsibility will leave us cold. If
white progressives want to be helpful, they can desist from enjoining us to
speak sweetly and step lightly in order to appease the sleeping gods on high.
They can talk to us about insurrection, about income redistribution, about
oppositional, destabilizing tactics that will force society to keep our concerns
on the front burner.
We need responsibility, but of a kind quite different from that called for by
West's Foreword. We do not need a graceful lecture on how to backpedal
slowly in a conservative era. We need writers and fellow travelers willing to
go out on a limb with us. Let us not talk about giving ground slowly, but
about retaking it. This, to my way of thinking, is what responsibility means
in times like ours.
91 Id. (discussing the importance of culture for the identity of the people, and
highlighting the significance of memory in the revolt).
100 If anything, our diffidence toward the poor has deepened in recent years. See
Delgado, On Taking Back Our Civil Rights Promises, 1989 Wis. L. REV. 579 (describing
how computers have made finding inequalities easier, but how limitations on civil rights
actions have made equality more elusive); see also Delgado, Inequality "From the Top":
Applying an Ancient Prohibition to an Emerging Problem of Distributive Justice, 32 UCLA
L. REV. 100 (1984) (focusing on two different types of government-imposed inequality: a
government's power to favor one group while ignoring another, and a government's
power to impoverish the other group directly).
101 Delgado, The Ethereal Scholar." Does Critical Legal Studies Have What Minorities
Want?, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 301 (1987) (critiquing the Critical Legal Studies
movement from a minority perspective).
102 Id.; Williams, supra note 40.
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